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Let the set of players be N ∪ {0}, where N = {1, 2, 3}, and player 0 is the Nature. The values of characteristic
function are v({1}) = 1, v({2}) = v({1, 2}) = 2, v({3}) = 1/2, v({2, 3}) = 5/2, v({1, 3}) = v({1, 2, 3}) = 3. The strategy
set of the leader is U0 = {Γ1,Γ2,Γ3}, where Γ1 = {12, 13}, Γ2 = {12, 23}, Γ3 = {13, 23}, the structures of which are
shown in Fig. 1. And T = {I1, I2}. The payoff function for players of type I1 is defined as
Ki(Γ, I1) = Yi(Γ) + |Γ(i)|, (1)
where Yi(Γ) is a component of Myerson value (see Myerson (1977)), and for players of type I2, it is defined as









is the average tree solution value (see Herings et al. (2008)) of Player i in game vCΓ(i) with structure
ΓCΓ(i).
Figure 1: Network structures of Γ1, Γ2 and Γ3.





Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
2/21 I1 I1 I1
4/21 I1 I1 I2
3/21 I1 I2 I1
2/21 I1 I2 I2
4/21 I2 I1 I1
3/21 I2 I1 I2
2/21 I2 I2 I1
1/21 I2 I2 I2
Table 1: Probability distribution defining the chance move.






Table 2: Conditional probability distribution p(· | t1 = I2).
Fig. 2-4 show the subgames Φ(xΓ1 ), Φ(xΓ2 ) and Φ(xΓ3 ) respectively. Moreover, the black lines starting from the
personal vertices of Player 2 and Player 3 show the unique Bayesian equilibrium in each subgame, and the black
lines of different lengths starting from the vertices at which the Nature makes the chance move show the various
probabilities with which the Nature selects for different type profiles. Note that Fig. 2-4 are obtained by software
Gambit (see McKelvey et al. (2006)). The program which is used to calculate the Bayesian equilibrium of any
subgame in the example can be asked from the authors.
Figure 2: Subgame Φ(xΓ1 ) with Player 1 as the leader.
Figure 3: Subgame Φ(xΓ2 ) with Player 1 as the leader.
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Figure 4: Subgame Φ(xΓ3 ) with Player 1 as the leader.
From Fig. 2-4, we can see that in subgame Φ(xΓ1 ), under the Bayesian equilibrium, Player 2 of type I1 will choose
‘a’ with probability 1, choose ‘r’ when he is of type I2, and for Player 3 of type either I1 or I2, he will choose ‘a’ with
probability 1. Similar conclusion can be obtained for both subgames Φ(xΓ2 ) and Φ(xΓ3 ).
Figure 5: Extensive game Φ.
Finally, three different expected payoff vectors given various strategies of the leader can be calculated after we get
the Bayesian equilibrium in each subgame. Specifically, we get G(b1) = (49/40, 127/60, 37/24), where b11 = (1, 0, 0)
under which Γ1 is chosen with probability 1, G(b2) = (53/60, 19/6, 61/60), where b21 = (0, 1, 0) under which Γ2 is
chosen with probability 1, and G(b3) = (133/120, 67/30, 223/120), where b31 = (0, 0, 1) under which Γ1 is chosen





−1 are the Bayesian equilibria
in the corresponding subgames, is the unique stable partially Bayesian equilibrium, also a Nash equilibrium in the
game. And (49/40, 127/60, 37/24) is the expected payoff vector under the stable partially Bayesian equilibrium. Fig.
3
5 shows the whole extensive game Φ, and all red lines compose the unique stable partially Bayesian equilibrium.
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